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Abstract
We study a market model in which competing rms use costly marketing
devices to inuence the set of alternatives which consumers perceive as relevant.
Consumers in our model are boundedly rational in the sense that they have
an imperfect perception of what is relevant to their decision problem. They
apply well-dened preferences to a consideration set, which is a function of
the marketing devices employed by the rms. We examine the implications of
this behavioral model in the context of a competitive market model, particularly
on industry prots, vertical product di¤erentiation, the use of marketing devices
and consumersconversion rates.
KEYWORDS: marketing, advertising, consideration sets, bounded rational-
ity, limited attention, persuasion, product display
1 Introduction
We present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are
boundedly rational and that rms use marketing tactics in an attempt to inuence
consumersdecision process. The standard model of consumer behavior assumes that
the consumer applies well-dened preferences to a perfectly perceived set of available
alternatives. We retain the assumption that consumers have stable preferences, but
relax the assumption that they have a perfect perception of what is relevant for their
consumption problem, thus allowing rms to manipulate that perception. Our aim is to
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explore the market implications of this departure from the standard model, especially
for the way rms deploy marketing strategies in competitive environments.
The cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace,
consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use
screening criteria (deliberate as well as unconscious) in order to reduce the number of
relevantalternatives. As a result, consumers apply their preferences not to the set of
objectively feasible alternatives, but to a potentially smaller set which they construct
at an earlier stage of the decision process. Borrowing a term from the marketing
literature, we refer to this set as the consideration set. The basic idea underlying
this term is that consumers may be unaware of some of the feasible products, and even
when they become aware of a new product, they still need to be persuaded to consider
it as a potential substitute to their currently consumed product.
Our model of consumer behavior attempts to capture the idea that consumers
do not automatically perceive all available options as relevant for their consumption
problem, and that they resist considering new alternatives. The role of marketing is
to overcome this resistance. Whether or not it succeeds depends on the competing
products and how they are marketed. The framework we propose accommodates a
variety of ways in which marketing inuences the formation of consideration sets. Here
are a few examples.
Example 1.1: Advertising content. An ad that highlights a drawback in a group of rival
products may attract the attention of consumers who currently consume those products
(tired of hours of waiting for customer service?having trouble keeping track of the
fees your credit company charges you?). Similarly, an ad for a product that highlights
one of its good features may give consumers of other products lacking this feature a
su¢ cient reason to consider the advertised product. The e¤ect of ad content in these
situations can go beyond mere information transmission. In particular, an ad that
points out a aw in a product the consumer regularly buys hardly tells him something
he does not already know, and it is not likely to modify his beliefs about the quality
of alternative products. However, it may have the rhetorical e¤ect of persuading him
to look for a substitute.
Example 1.2: Argumentation by a salesperson. Think of a consumer who enters a
car dealership with the intention to buy a new car. The consumer has a particular
car model in mind. As he inspects it on the display podium, he is approached by a
salesperson who tries to convince him to consider a di¤erent car model, using arguments
(which may or may not be factually true) that point out similarities and di¤erences
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between the two models.
Example 1.3: Positioning. Economists have extensively studied the way rms strate-
gically di¤erentiate their products in the space of product attributes. However, mar-
keting a product often involves locating it in the more amorphous space of images and
consumer perceptions. This type of product di¤erentiation is known in the marketing
literature as positioning. For instance, a yogurt with given objective characteristics
can be marketed with an emphasis on hedonic features such as taste and texture, or
on health-related features, real or imaginary. Two yogurt brands may be di¤erentiated
in terms of their positioning even when their objective characteristics are very similar.
Although this type of product di¤erentiation may be payo¤-irrelevant, it can a¤ect the
consumers decision whether to consider a new brand.
Examples 1.4: Search engine optimization. The internet has given rise to new market-
ing devices with which sellers try to expand consumersconsideration sets. Think of a
consumer who wishes to spend a weekend in a quiet place out in the countryside. To
nd such a place on the internet, the consumer needs to enter keywords in a search en-
gine. However, there is a variety of keywords he can use: country inn, lodge, bed
and breakfast, cottage, etc. The consumers choice of keyword is likely to be guided
by the labels he encountered in past vacations. Di¤erent keywords will elicit di¤erent
lists, and suppliers can manipulate the list by bidding for keywords in sponsored-links
auctions, or by employing a variety of search engine optimizationtechniques.
We propose a simple model of consideration set formation and embed it in a market
environment in which rms employ marketing techniques to manipulate consideration
sets. In our market model, there are two identical rms and a continuum of identical
consumers. Each rm chooses a pair, a product x and a marketing strategy M , and
incurs a xed cost associated with its choice (x;M). Each consumer is initially assigned
(randomly) to one of the rms. The consumers initial consideration set includes only
the product o¤ered by that rm. This is interpreted as the consumers status quo, or
default product.
Whether or not the consumer also considers the competing rms product will
depend on a primitive of his decision procedure, called the consideration function. This
is a function that determines whether a consumer who initially considers a product x
accompanied by a marketing strategy M will also consider a new product x0 when the
latter is accompanied by the marketing strategyM 0. If the consumer ends up including
both rmsproducts in his consideration set, he chooses his most preferred product,
according to a strict preference relation dened on the set of products. Preferences are
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stable and impervious to marketing.
In general, the consideration function can depend on all four variables, x;M; x0;M 0.
We begin, however, with a more special case in which the consideration set is only a
function of the default product x and the marketing strategyM 0 that accompanies the
new product. Each of the examples 1.1-1.4 includes situations that t this specication.
However, in order to x ideas, we will use advertising content as the main "story"
behind the class of consideration functions under study. We impose additional structure
by assuming that a marketing strategy is a collection of marketing devices, and that
the consideration function is "separable" in some sense with respect to these devices.
In particular, if a rm employs all available marketing devices, it guarantees that
consumers will include its product in their consideration set.
Thus, the consumerschoice procedure determines the rmsmarket shares as a
function of their products and marketing strategies. We analyze symmetric Nash equi-
libria of the game played by the two rms, under the assumption that the rms
objective is to maximize market share minus xed costs. We use this model to address
the following questions:
 Does the bounded rationality of consumers - namely their resistance to consid-
ering new products - enable rms to earn prots in excess of what they would
earn if consumers were rational? Or does market competition (which includes
marketing) eliminate this potential source of exploitation?
 What is the link between rmsmarketing strategy and their product quality
choice?
 Do rmsprots necessarily decrease as consumers become more rational in
the sense of being more likely to consider new products?
 How does the fraction of consumers who switch a supplier in equilibrium de-
pend on the fundamentals of the market model, particularly the consumerscon-
sideration function? What is the probability of switching to the new product
conditional on having been persuaded to consider it?
Our main results can be summarized as follows.
Equilibrium prots
We show that as long as costs are not too high, there exists a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium in which rms earn the same prots they would earn if consumers were rational.
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We also show that when the consideration function is "partitional", every symmetric
Nash equilibrium satises this property. We provide a complete characterization of
symmetric equilibria for this case. A notable feature of this characterization is that it
jointly describes the vertical product di¤erentiation in the market and the marketing
strategies that rms use to promote their products.
Consumer conversion
In any symmetric equilibriumwith rational-consumer prots, marketing is e¤ectivein
the following sense. Consumers who add a new product to their consideration set always
end up buying the new product. Thus, symmetric equilibria with rational-consumer
prots exhibit perfect correlation between persuading a consumer to consider a new
product and persuading him to buy it, even though the two are a priori independent.
Does greater consumer rationality make the market outcome more competitive?
Finally, we discuss the e¤ect of enhancing consumer rationality on industry equi-
librium prots. We begin with a particular consideration function that generates
rational-consumer prots in all symmetric Nash equilibria. We examine two indepen-
dent, closely related perturbations. First, we introduce a group of rational consumers
into the population. We show that rmsequilibrium prots increase as a result, as
long as the group of rational inltrators is not too large. Second, we retain the ho-
mogeneity of the consumer population, but modify their consideration function so as
to make it more rational, in the sense that the consideration set coincides with the
feasible set in a larger set of consumption problems. This turns out to give rise to
new symmetric equilibria with higher, collusive industry prots. These two exam-
ples demonstrate that industry equilibrium prots are not necessarily monotonically
decreasing with the degree of consumer rationality.
Our nal piece of analysis extends the model of consumer behavior by allowing
the consideration function to depend on the entire prole of the rmsproducts and
marketing strategies. This extension widens the array of marketing phenomena that
our model can capture, including product positioning, packaging, display, and the use
of "irrelevant" products as attention grabbers. We demonstrate this potential with two
market applications of this extended model.
The main contribution of our paper is the introduction of a framework for modelling
the persuading to considerrole of marketing, and the demonstration that it can illu-
minate aspects of competitive marketing. Our framework is exible; it can incorporate
a large variety of marketing methods, and in particular it enables us to address aspects
of advertising content that are typically hard to capture with standard models.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the consumers choice procedure.
Section 3 presents the market model in which we embed the consideration-sets proce-
dure and analyzes its symmetric Nash equilibria. Section 4 presents the extended model
and analyzes two market applications. Section 5 discusses several choice-theoretic as-
pects of our model. Section 6 contains a detailed discussion of the papers relation to
the marketing literatures, as well as the economic literature on advertising. Section 7
concludes.
2 Consumer Choice
Let X be a nite set of products. Let M be a nite set of marketing strategies.
An extended product is a pair (x;M) 2 X  M - i.e., a product and a marketing
strategy that accompanies it. Consumers in this paper will face choice problems that
involve ordered pairs of extended products, ((xs;M s); (xn;Mn)) 2 D2, where D 
X  M. The ordering has signicance for us, as we will interpret (xs;M s) as the
consumers status quo or default, while (xn;Mn) represents a new alternative. Given
a pair ((xs;M s); (xn;Mn)), the feasible set of products is taken to be fxs; xng.
Consumer choice follows a two-stage procedure, which is based on two primitives:
a linear ordering  over X, and a consideration function , which assigns the value 0
or 1 to every pair (xs;Mn). In the rst stage, the consumer constructs a consideration
set, which can take two values: fxs; xng if (xs;Mn) = 1, or fxsg if (xs;Mn) = 0.
In the former case, the consideration set coincides with the objectively feasible set. In
the latter case, it consists of the default option alone and thus forms a strict subset of
the objectively feasible set. In the second stage of the choice procedure, the consumer
chooses the -maximal product in the consideration set.
We interpret the linear ordering  as the consumers truepreferences over X.
The preference ranking x  y is a genuine reection of the consumers taste, which is
applied after serious consideration or actual experience with the products. This taste is
stable and impervious to marketing. Put di¤erently, if the consumer always considered
all feasible products, then his revealed choices of products would be rationalized by ,
which is also the preference criterion we adopt for welfare analysis. Throughout the
paper, x and x denote the -maximal and -minimal products in X, respectively.
The consideration function  enriches our description of the consumers psychology.
In addition to his preferences over products, the consumer is characterized by his
willingness (or ability) to consider xn as a potential substitute to xs, and how this
willingness depends on the way the new product is marketed. Indeed, personality
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psychologists often regard openness to experience as one of the basic traits that
dene an individuals personality (see Goldberg (1993)). The consideration function
may be viewed as a representation of this trait: 0 represents a more openpersonality
than  if (xs;Mn) = 1 implies 0(xs;Mn) = 1.
We say that (y;N) beats (x;M) if (x;N) = 1 and y  x. Denote this binary
relation on D by . This is the (strict) revealed preference relation induced by the
(; ) procedure. This binary relation may violate transitivity. To see why, consider
the following example. Assume x00  x0  x, (x;M 0) = 1, (x0;M 00) = 1 and
(x;M 00) = 0. Then, (x0;M 0)  (x;M) and (x00;M 00)  (x0;M 0), yet (x00;M 00) 
(x;M). Likewise, it can be shown that the weak revealed preference relation induced
by the choice procedure may be incomplete as well as intransitive.
The beating relation does satisfy certain rationality properties. First, although
 may violate transitivity, it does not contain cycles of any length. In addition,
 satises the following property: (y;N)  (x;M) implies (x;M 0)  (y;N 0) for
all M 0; N 0  D. That is, marketing cannot reverse the consumers revealed prefer-
ences over products. In particular, when the two extended products are simply the
same product in two di¤erent guises, the consumer never strictly prefers one extended
product to another. The reason is that in our model, marketing can manipulate con-
sumersperception of the feasible set, but it does not manipulate their preferences. We
elaborate more on the choice theoretic aspects of our model in Section 5.
Note that our choice model displays a status-quo bias. Given (xs;M s) and (xn;Mn),
the consumer chooses the default/status-quo product xs whenever xs  xn. However,
the consumer may continue to choose xs even when xn  xs, if it happens to be the case
that (xs;Mn) = 0. This is a status-quo bias of a di¤erent kind than the one usually
referred to in the literature (see Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)), which is a preference bias
that assigns an implicit switching cost to any departure from the status quo option. In
our choice model, the bias in favor of the status-quo inheres in an earlier stage of the
decision process, in which the consumer constructs the set of alternatives he will later
consider for choice. Thus, the alternative to the status-quo is at a disadvantage not
because the consumer tends to nd it inferior to the status quo, but because he does
not always take it into serious consideration.1
Comment: Can we distinguish between "product" and "marketing"?
The model draws a distinction between the product x and the marketing strategy M
that is employed to promote it. In reality, the boundary between the two is often
1There is also a formal di¤erence between the two notions of status-quo bias, which we discuss in
Section 5.
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blurred. For example, is the packaging of a product a pure marketing strategy, or is
it part of the products description? Any application of the consideration-sets model
involves a modeling judgment as to which aspects of the product are payo¤-relevant
and which are viewed as pure marketing.
3 A Market Model
The heart of this paper is a market model that incorporates the choice procedure
introduced in Section 2. Our market consists of two identical rms and a continuum
of identical consumers. The rms play a symmetric simultaneous-move game. The
strategy space is D  X M, which is assumed to be su¢ ciently rich in the sense
that (x;?) 2 D for every x 2 X and (x;M) 2 D for every M 2 M. One reason
for restricting the set of strategies is that a particular marketing strategy M may be
inherently infeasible for promoting a given product x. For instance, when marketing
involves highlighting certain product features, it is natural to assume that a rm cannot
highlight a feature that its product lacks. The assumption that rms have identical
strategy spaces is not innocuous, as it rules out rm-specic brand names as marketing
devices.
For expositional purposes, we will consistently interpretM as a set of advertising
strategies. We assume that a rm builds an advertising strategy by putting together a
number of elements that serve to attract the consumers attention. These are viewed
as the building blocksthat a rm can use to advertise its product, such as possible
slogans, images or tunes that may accompany ads, commercials or jingles, and so forth.
Formally, let D be a nite set of advertising messages, where a generic element in D is
denoted m. LetM 2D. That is, an advertising strategy is a collection of advertising
messages.
Each consumer is initially assigned to one of the rms (where each rm receives half
the population of consumers). The extended product chosen by this rm plays the role
of the default in the consumers choice procedure. Thus, a rms extended product is
the default for half the consumer population and the contender for the other half. The
consumers decision whether to switch to the rival rms product is governed by the
consideration-sets procedure described in Section 2. The primitives of this procedure
are the preference relation  and the consideration function . We interpret  as
representing product quality.
Choosing a strategy (x;M) 2 D entails a xed cost for the rm, denoted c(x;M).
We assume that rms aim to maximize market share minus costs, where costs are
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normalized so that they are expressed in terms of market shares. The tuple hD; c;; i
thus fully denes the simultaneous-move game played between the rms, where D is
the strategy space and rm is payo¤ function is as follows:
i((x1;M1); (x2;M2)) =
8><>:
1
2
[1 + (xj;Mi)]  c(xi;Mi) if xi  xj
1
2
[1  (xi;Mj)]  c(xi;Mi) if xj  xi
1
2
  c(xi;Mi) if xi = xj
(1)
We assume that c(x;M) = cx +
P
m2M cm. All cx and cm are strictly positive. Since
we interpret preferences as representing product quality, it makes sense to assume that
x  y implies cx  cy, with strict inequality for x = x.
The payo¤ function (1) captures a non-trivial strategic dilemma. On one hand, rm
i has an incentive to save costs by lowering its product quality. In this case, it will aim
to choose a suitable low-quality product xi for which (xi;Mj) = 0, so that consumers
who are initially assigned to rm i will fail to consider rm js higher-quality product.
On the other hand, rm i has an incentive to increase its market share by o¤ering a
better product than rm j. In this case, it will aim to choose a suitable advertising
strategy Mi for which (xj;Mi) = 1, so that consumers who are initially assigned to
rm j will consider rm is higher-quality product.
We assume that c(x;M) < 1
2
for all (x; ) 2 D and (;M) 2 D. To understand
the role of this assumption, note that the game played by the two rms is akin to a
generalized all-pay auction with limited comparability of bids, where ties are broken by
a lottery. In the rational-consumer benchmark, the two rms compete to win control of
a market by o¤ering di¤erent quality levels. Each rm o¤ers a product x and pays a cost
of cx to make this o¤er (such that higher quality corresponds to a higher cost). The rm
that o¤ers the highest possible quality wins, and if both rms o¤er the same quality,
one is randomly chosen to be the winner. Allowing for boundedly rational consumers
- in the sense that (x;M) = 0 for some pairs (x;M) - is equivalent to assuming that
some pairs of products cannot be compares. However, by investing in marketing, a
rm can enable a comparison. Each rm then faces the trade-o¤ we alluded to above:
it can either invest in quality and marketing to force a comparison, or it can lower its
quality, save on costs and try to reach a draw by preventing a comparison. Thus, our
assumption that c() < 1
2
means that a rm would do anythingto force a comparison
when it o¤ers the better product.
Throughout the paper, we use  to denote a mixed strategy (namely, a probability
distribution over D), and Supp() to denote its support. We favor the population
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interpretation of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium: there is a sea of rms, from
which two are randomly selected to play the roles of a default and a contender. Finally,
(x) =
P
M (x;M) is the probability that the product x is o¤ered under .
An important benchmark for this model is the case of a rational consumer. This case
is subsumed into our model by letting (x;M) = 1 for all (x; ) 2 D and (;M) 2 D. A
consumer with such a consideration function always considers all objectively feasible
products, and therefore always chooses according to . Under consumer rationality,
each rm plays the pair (x;?) in Nash equilibrium, and consequently earns a payo¤
of 1
2
  cx. We refer to the latter as the rational-consumer payo¤ .
Note that the game played by the two rms is akin to an all-pay auction with
limited comparability of bids, where ties are broken by a lottery. To see this, consider
rst the rational benchmark. The two rms compete to win control of a market by
o¤ering di¤erent quality levels. Each rm o¤ers a product x and pays a cost of cx to
make this o¤er (such that higher quality corresponds to a higher cost). In the rational
benchmark, the rm that o¤ers the highest possible quality wins, and if both rms o¤er
the same quality, one is randomly chosen to be the winner. Allowing for boundedly
rational consumers, in the sense that  gets the value zero for some pairs (x;M); is
equivalent to assuming that some pairs of products are di¢ cult to compare (e.g., when
products are multi-dimensional). However, by investing in marketing a rm can enable
a comparison. Each rm then faces the trade-o¤ we alluded to above: it can either
invest in quality and marketing to force a comparison, or it can save on costs and
try to reach a draw by preventing a comparison. Thus, from the point of view of the
rm, our assumption that the consumer randomly picks its default is equivalent to the
assumption that when bids are non comparable, the winner is randomly chosen.
In analyzing the case of boundedly rational consumers, we impose two conditions
on the consideration function :
(P1) (x;M) = 1 if and only if there exists m 2M such that (x; fmg) = 1.
(P2) For every x 6= x, there exists m 2 D such that (x; fmg) = 1.
Property (P1) means that the e¤ects of di¤erent advertising messages on consumer
attention are "separable": whether or not a particular message persuades the consumer
to consider a new product is independent of the other messages that promote the new
product. In particular, active marketing (i.e. Mn 6= ?) is necessary for the new
product xn to enter the consumers consideration set. Henceforth, we will say that the
message m is e¤ective against x whenever (x; fmg) = 1. Let X(m) denote the set
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of products against which m is e¤ective, i.e.,
X(m)  fx 2 X : (x; fmg) = 1g (2)
Property (P2) ensures that as long as the default product is not x, it is always
possible to persuade the consumer to consider the new product. Therefore, by Prop-
erty (P1), even if a rm is uncertain of the consumers default, it can ensure being
considered by employing the grand set of advertising messages D. Note that consider-
ation functions that satisfy Properties (P1)-(P2) typically induce a beating relation
that violates transitivity.
We also assume that (x; fmg) = 0 for every m 2 D. This assumption is made
purely for future notational convenience and entails no loss of generality. To see this,
note if a consumers default is the best product, x; then this consume will never switch
to the product of the rival rm, even if he ends up considering it. Hence, from (1) it
follows that when rm i o¤ers (x;Mi) the expression (x;Mj) will not enter its payo¤
function.
These two properties, together with the assumption that c(x;M) < 1
2
for all (x;M),
imply that (x;?) is the max-min strategy in this game. Consequently, 1
2
  cx is the
max-min payo¤. Recall that we already observed that these are the Nash equilib-
rium strategy and Nash equilibrium payo¤, respectively, under the rational-consumer
benchmark. Thus, all the tuples hD; c;; i share the same max-min outcome, and
this outcome coincides with the Nash equilibrium outcome when  corresponds to the
case of rational consumers.
Comment: Limitations of the market model
The biggest limitation of our model is that it abstracts from price setting. This is
primarily for the sake of analytic convenience: given the central role that xed costs
play in the model, it is simpler to analyze the model when the value of attracting a
consumer is held xed. Spatial competition models provide a precedent for this research
strategy. When teaching Hotellings main streetmodel, say, it is both easier and
illuminating to begin analysis by assuming that rms care only about market share,
and defer the incorporation of prices into the model.
Nevertheless, this assumption does t a variety of competitive environments where
marketing plays a key role. In media markets such as broadcast television or internet
portals, prices do not play a strategic role and revenues are directly linked to the number
of viewers or users. In addition, in line with our model, consumers or users in these
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markets typically have one defaultsupplier (e.g., one television network they are used
to watching in a particular time slot, or one internet portal that serves as a homepage
in their browser - see Meyer and Muthaly (2008), Bucklin and Sismeiro (2003) and
the references therein). The role of marketing is thus to persuade consumers to switch
away from their default. Non-prot organizations are another example in which pricing
is irrelevant and marketing is important. For example, think of the way fund raisers
for charity organizations compete for donors (for more examples, see Kotler and Levy
(1969)). We discuss further the issue of prices in the concluding section.
Another limitation of our market model is that it treats the likelihood that a given
rm plays the role of a default for a given consumer as exogenous, thus independent
of the rms marketing strategy. We make this assumption because we are primarily
interested in the role of marketing in attracting consumer attention away from com-
peting products. However, the assumption entails some loss of generality. If a rms
marketing strategy is good at attracting consumersattention away from the rival rm,
it would probably also be good at attracting consumersinitial attention, thereby in-
creasing the fraction of consumers for whom the rm is the default option. In addition,
marketing determines not only the allocation of consumer attention within the indus-
try, but also the level of consumersawareness of the industry as a whole. Extending
our framework in this direction is left for future work.
3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
In this Sub-section we analyze symmetric Nash equilibria in the market model. We
begin with the following simple example that captures an advertising technology in the
manner of Butters (1977): consumers become aware of a new product if and only if it
is advertised (note that unlike our model, in Butters (1977) consumers are not initially
attached to any rm: if no rm advertises, consumers stay out of the market).
Proposition 1 Suppose that D consists of a single messagem. Then, there is a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium, given by:
(x;?) = 2cm (3)
(x; fmg) = 2(cx   cx) (4)
(x;?) = 1  2(cx   cx + cm) (5)
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We omit the proof of this result since it is a special case of Proposition 4, which is
proven below. The equilibrium has several noteworthy properties:
1. The equilibrium strategy is mixed and consumers end up buying an inferior prod-
uct with positive probability. However, the most preferred product x is o¤ered
with positive probability as well.
2. Firms advertise with positive probability.
3. Although the equilibrium outcome departs from the rational-consumer bench-
mark, rms earn the rational-consumer (max-min) payo¤ 1
2
  cx. This follows
directly from the observation that (x;?) 2 Supp().
4. The equilibrium exhibits a strong correlation between advertising and product
quality: the only product that is advertised in equilibrium is the most preferred
product.
5. Vertical product di¤erentiation is extreme: the only products o¤ered in equilib-
rium are x and x.
Our task in this sub-section is to investigate the extent to which these properties
are general. Let us begin with two lemmas that demonstrate the generality of the rst
two properties.
Lemma 1 Let  be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, (x) 2 (0; 1).
Proof. Assume that (x) = 0. Let y denote the -minimal product for which
() > 0. The market share that any (y;M) 2 Supp() generates in equilibrium is at
most 1
2
. If a rm deviated to (x; D), it would ensure a market share of one. By the
assumption that c(x;M) < 1
2
for all (x;M), this deviation is protable.
Now assume that (x
) = 1. Since it is impossible to beat any strategy (x;M),
the unique best-reply to  is (x;?). Hence, (x;?) = 1. Thus, rms earn 1
2
  cx
under . But then it is protable for any rm to deviate to the strategy (x;?), since
it generates a payo¤ of 1
2
  cx > 12   cx against .
Lemma 2 Let  be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, there exist x 2 X
and M 6= ? such that (x;M) > 0.
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Proof. If M = ? for every (x;M) 2 Supp(), then by Lemma 1, (x;?) 2 Supp().
Since this strategy does not beat any other strategy, rms earn a payo¤of 1
2
 cx under
. If a rm deviates to strategy (x;?), it will generate a payo¤ of 12   cx > 12   cx
against . The reason is that since there is no active advertising in , the strategy
(x;?) is not beaten by any strategy in Supp().
Our next result demonstrates that the third and fourth properties are general in
the sense that there always exists a symmetric equilibrium that satises them.
Proposition 2 There exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy  such that:
(i) rms earn a payo¤ of 1
2
  cx under .
(ii) for every (x;M) 2 Supp(), x = x or M = ?.
Proof. We construct a mixed strategy  and show that it constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategy. Let us rst construct Supp(). The rst element in Supp() is
(x;?). Let y1 be the -minimal product in X. By assumption, (x;?) fails to
beat (y1;?). Add (y1;?) to Supp(). Let m1 be the least costly message m for
which (y1; fmg) = 1. By Property Property (P1), such a message must exist. Add
(x; fm1g) to Supp(). This concludes the rst step of the construction.
The rest of the construction proceeds iteratively. For some k 2 f1; :::; jXj 2g, sup-
pose that Supp() contains the pairs (y1;?); :::; (yk;?) and (x;?); (x; fm1g); :::; (x; fm1; :::;mkg).
If (y; fm1; :::;mkg) = 1 for all y 6= x, then the construction of Supp() is complete.
Otherwise, let yk+1 be the -minimal product y for which (y; fm1; :::;mkg) = 0,
and add (yk+1;?) to Supp(). Let mk+1 be the least costly message m for which
(yk+1; fmg) = 1. By Property (P1), there must exist such a message, and by con-
struction, mk+1 =2 fm1; :::;mkg. Add (x; fm1; :::;mk;mk+1g) to Supp(). Property
(P1) guarantees that the iterative process must be terminated after K  jXj   1
steps, such that for every k  K, the strategy (yk;?) is beaten by all strategies
(x; fm1; :::;mlg) with l  k, and - given our assumption that  is independent of x2 -
by no other strategy in Supp().
It remains to assign probabilities to each member of Supp(). For every k 2
f1; :::; Kg let
(yk;?) = 2cmk
and
KX
l=k
(x; fm1; :::;mlg) = 2(cx   cyk)
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In addition, let
(x;?) = 1  2[cx   cy1 +
KX
k=1
cmk ]
By our assumptions on costs, all values of () are between zero and one. (Note,
however, that if cyk = cyk+1 for some k, then (x; fm1; :::;mkg) = 0, and therefore,
strictly speaking, (x; fm1; :::;mkg) does not belong to Supp().) By construction, the
values of () add up to one.
Note that by construction,  satises properties (i) and (ii). First, for every
(x;m) 2 Supp(), x = x or M = ?. Second, since (x;?) 2 Supp(), rms earn a
payo¤ of 1
2
 cx under . It thus remains to show that  constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategy.
To show this, we rst claim that if (y;M) is a best-reply to , then so is (y;?).
The expected gain in market share from playing (y;M) instead of (y;?) is
X
m2M
X
yk2X(m)
1
2
(y
k)
By construction, (yk;M) = 1 if and only if mk 2 M , where mk 6= ml for k 6= l. In
addition, (y
k) = 2cmk , wheremk is the least costly messagem for which (yk; fmg) =
1. This means that the expected gain in market share from M cannot be lower than
the cost of M . This in turn implies that the expected payo¤ from (y;?) cannot be
lower than the expected payo¤ from (y;M).
It follows that in searching for protable deviations from , it su¢ ces to check for
strategies of the form (y;?). By construction, all strategies in Supp() generate a
payo¤ of 1
2
  cx against . Furthermore, by construction, x  yK      y1, and for
every y for which yk+1  y  yk, cy  cyk and (y; fmkg) = 1. This means that (y;?)
generates the same market share as (yk;?) and costs no less. Therefore, (y;?) cannot
be a protable deviation. This concludes the proof.
The result that rms earn rational-consumer payo¤s in equilibrium is of interest for
several reasons. First, it shows that although consumersbounded rationality initially
creates an opportunity for rms to earn payo¤s above the rational-consumer bench-
mark, competitive forces (which include marketing) eliminate this potential. Second,
the equilibrium outcome is Pareto inferior to the rational-consumer benchmark: rms
earn the same prots in both cases, while consumers are strictly worse o¤ in the
bounded-rationality case. Third, rational-consumer payo¤s imply that rms are indif-
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ferent between any advertising strategy that is employed in equilibrium and the option
of no advertising. The reason is that if a rm strictly prefers some (x;M) 2 Supp()
to the strategy (x;?), then the strategy (x;?) would generate payo¤s strictly above
1
2
  cx.
Finally, rational-consumer payo¤s turn out to have strong implications for the equi-
librium correlation between product quality and marketing, and consequently on con-
sumer conversion rates. We will explore these implications in greater detail in Sub-
Section 3.2. At this point, it will su¢ ce to point out that part (ii) of Proposition 2 is
not general: there exist equilibria in which rms earn rational-consumer payo¤s and
yet inferior products are actively marketed.2
Symmetric equilibria in which rms earn rational-consumer payo¤s have the fol-
lowing interesting property. For every pure strategy (x;M) in the support of the
equilibrium strategy , each message in M is e¤ective against a distinct set of prod-
ucts that are o¤ered in equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy thus exhibits marketing
e¢ ciency, in the sense that rms employ a minimal set of messages that are necessary
for manipulating consumersconsideration sets. This property was in fact used in the
constructive proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Let  be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy in which rms earn
rational-consumer payo¤s. For every (x;M) 2 Supp() and every m;m0 2M , the sets
fx 2 X(m) : (x) > 0g and fx 2 X(m0) : (x) > 0g are disjoint.
Proof. Assume the contrary - i.e., that there exist (x;M) 2 Supp() and two messages
m;m0 2M such that the two sets fx 2 X(m) : (x) > 0g and fx 2 X(m0) : (x) >
0g have a non-empty intersection. Then, the marginal contribution of m0 to the market
share generated by (x;M) is strictly below 1
2
P
y2X(m0) (y). Since (x;M) is a best-
reply to , this implies that 1
2
P
y2X(m0) (y) > cm0. By the assumption that rms
earn rational-consumer payo¤s in equilibrium, the strategy (x;?) is a best-reply to .
It follows that if one of the rms deviates from (x;?) to (x; fm0g), it would earn a
payo¤ in excess of the rational-consumer level, a contradiction.
Suppose that the partitional property described in Proposition 3 holds not only
with respect to the products that are o¤ered in equilibrium, but with respect to the
grand set of products. That is, assume that the collection fX(m)gm2D is a partition of
2In the constructive proof of Proposition 2, it is easy to see that when K > 1, some of the weight
that is assigned to (x; fm1g), say, can be shifted to a new strategy (y2; fm1g), without upsetting any
of the equilibrium conditions.
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Xnfxg. This case ts situations in which there is a pre-existing natural categorization
of products (e.g., health versus non-health food products), such that an individual mes-
sage is e¤ective against a specic category of target products. Under this special case,
we are able to provide a complete characterization of the set of symmetric equilibria.
For every m 2 D, let y(m) denote the -minimal product in X(m). Given a
mixed strategy , let (m) =
P
M3m (x;M) be the probability that the message m
is played under .
Proposition 4 Assume fX(m)gm2D is a partition of Xnfxg. In any symmetric
Nash equilibrium :
(i) rms earn a payo¤ of 1
2
  cx.
(ii) for every m 2 D,
(m) = 2(cx   cy(m))
(x) =
8><>:
2cm if x = y
(m)
1  2Pm2D cm if x = x
0 otherwise
Proof. (i) Assume the contrary - i.e., that rms earn more than the rational-consumer
payo¤ 1
2
  cx under some symmetric equilibrium strategy . By Lemma 1, Supp()
contains a strategy of the form (x;M). The strategy (x;?) generates the rational-
consumer payo¤ against any strategy. Therefore, it must be the case that M 6= ?
for every (x;M) 2 Supp(). For every (x;M) 2 Supp() and every m 2 M ,
1
2
P
x2X(m) (x)   cm  0, with at least one strict inequality for some m - other-
wise the strategy (x;M) could not generate a payo¤ above the rational-consumer
level.
It follows that if m =2 M 0 for some (x;M 0) 2 Supp(), it is protable to de-
viate to (x;M 0 [ fmg). Hence, m 2 M for all (x;M) 2 Supp(). Moreover,
because 1
2
P
x2X(m) (x)  cm > 0, there exists ym 6= x such that (ym) > 0 and
ym 2 X(m). It must therefore be the case that (x;M) beats (ym ;M 0) for every
(x;M); (ym ;M 0) 2 Supp().
Let y denote the -minimal product among all these products ym. If (y;?) is not
a best-reply to , then there must exist m such that 1
2
P
x2X(m);yx (x) cm > 0 and
m 2M for every (y;M) 2 Supp(). But this implies that m 2M for every (x;M) 2
Supp(), which means that there is a product y0 such that y  y0 and (x;M) beats
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(y0;M 0) for every (x;M); (y0;M 0) 2 Supp(), contradicting the denition of y. It
follows that (y;?) is a best-reply to .
If a rm deviates from (y;?) to (x; D), it will increase its market share by at
least 1
2
(x
) + 1
2
(1  (x)) = 12 . Since by assumption c(x; D) < 12 , the deviation is
protable, a contradiction. It follows that rms cannot earn more than 1
2
  cx in .
Since this is the rational-consumer payo¤, rms must earn exactly 1
2
  cx in .
(ii) First, we claim that for every m 2 M , (m) > 0 and (x) > 0 for some
x 2 X(m). If (m) = 0, then when a rm plays (x;?), where x 6= x and x 2 X(m),
it earns a payo¤ 1
2
  cx > 12   cx, since by assumption x =2 X(m0) for every m0 6= m.
If (x) = 0, then it is optimal to set (m) = 0, a contradiction.
Second, part (i) implies that for every m 2M , 1
2
P
x2X(m) (x)  cm - otherwise, a
rm could play (x; fmg) and earn a payo¤above the rational-consumer level. However,
if the inequality is strict, rms will nd it optimal to set (m) = 0. Therefore,
1
2
P
x2X(m) (x) = cm for every m 2 D. In particular, this means that if (x) > 0,
the strategy (x;?) must be a best-reply against . Denote by m(x) the message which
is e¤ective against x. Then, the payo¤ from (x;?) is 1
2
  cx   12[m(x)]. Consider a
product x satisfying (x) > 0 and x 2 X(m). If x  y for some y 2 X(m), then if
a rm deviated to (y;?) it would earn a payo¤ of
1
2
  cy   1
2
[m(x)] >
1
2
  cx   1
2
[m(x)]
in contradiction to the assumption that (x) > 0. It follows that the only strategy
x 2 X(m) for which (x) > 0 is y(m), namely the -minimal product in X(m).
And since the payo¤ from (y(m);?) must be the rational-consumer payo¤, it must be
the case that (m) = 2cx   2cy(m).
Thus, when fX(m)gm2D is a partition of Xnfxg, all symmetric Nash equilibria
induce rational-consumer payo¤s. Apart from x, the only products that are o¤ered in
equilibrium are the inferior products in each cell of the induced partition. The more
costly the message, the higher the probability with which its inferior target product
is o¤ered. The higher the cost of the target product, the lower the probability with
which the message is employed.
Targeted advertising
The case of partitional consideration functions allows us to explore the notion of tar-
geted advertising. Most discussions of targeting focus on the way advertising campaigns
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are tailored to particular groups of consumers that di¤er in their preferences. In our
model, consumers are homogeneous. However, given a mixed-strategy equilibrium,
di¤erent consumers have di¤erent default products, and therefore di¤erent marketing
strategies may be required in order to persuade them to consider new products. A
ner partition fX(m)gm2D represents a situation in which there is greater advertising
targeting.
It is interesting to examine how ((m))m2D and ((x))x2X behave with respect
to the coarseness of the partition induced by . For simplicity, let us x
P
m2D cm
and compare two extreme cases: (1) the Buttersexample analyzed in Proposition 1,
and (2) the case in which for every x 6= x there is a unique message m(x) which is
e¤ective against x (i.e., X(m) = fxg). The di¤erence between the two cases is that in
case 2 messages are specically tailored to a particular target product, while in case 1,
advertising is not targeted at all, such that a single message attracts every consumers
attention.
Since
P
m2D cm is held xed, (x
) is the same in the symmetric equilibria of both
cases. However, in case 2, relative to case 1, some of the weight that the equilibrium
strategy assigns to the least preferred product in X is shifted to intermediate quality
products. This is a general corollary of Proposition 4: greater advertising targeting
results in an upward shift in the equilibrium distribution of product quality.
3.2 Consumer Conversion
In the example analyzed in Proposition 1, we saw that in symmetric equilibrium, rms
use active marketing only to promote the most preferred product x. However, as
already mentioned, this is not a general property. Instead, there is a weaker property
that captures the correlation between product quality and advertising in symmetric
equilibria that induce rational-consumer payo¤s.
Denition 1 (E¤ective Marketing Property) A mixed strategy  satises the ef-
fective marketing property if for every (x;M); (x0;M 0) 2 Supp(), (x;M 0) = 1 implies
x0  x.
The e¤ective marketing property means that whenever a consumer considers a new
product thanks to the marketing strategy that accompanies that product, he ends up
buying it. (Note that when x = x, (x;M) = 0 by assumption for all M . However,
since this assumption was introduced merely as a notational convenience, it is perhaps
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more appropriate to rule out the case of x = x in the denition of the e¤ective
marketing property.)
Proposition 5 Let  be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy that induces rational-
consumer payo¤s. Then,  satises the e¤ective marketing property.
Proof. Let (x;M); (x0;M 0) 2 Supp(), (x;M 0) = 1, and yet x  x0. By assumption,
x 6= x, hence x  x0. For every strategy (x0;M 0), let B(x0;M 0) denote the set of
strategies in Supp() that (x0;M 0) beats. Recall that the set of strategies that beat
(x0;M 0) is independent of M 0. In order for (x0;M 0) to be a best-reply to , it must be
weakly preferred to (x0;?), and therefore satisfy the following inequality:X
(y;N)2B(x0;M 0)nB(x0;?)
(y;N)  2
X
m2M 0
cm
By the assumption that rms earn rational-consumer payo¤s under , the strategy
(x;?) is a best-reply to . Note that B(x;?) = ?, hence B(x0;M 0) n B(x0;?) =
B(x0;M 0). Suppose that a rm deviates to (x;M 0). In order for this deviation to be
unprotable, the following inequality must hold:X
(y;N)2B(x;M 0)
(y;N)  2
X
m2M 0
cm
Because x  x0, it must be the case that B(x0;M 0)  B(x;M 0). Moreover, since
(x;M 0) = 1, the inclusion is strict. Therefore,X
(y;N)2B(x;M 0)
(y;N) >
X
(y0;N 0)2B(x0;M 0)
(y0; N 0)
which contradicts the combination of the preceding pair of inequalities.
The e¤ective marketing property is a result that characterizes consumer conversion
rates - that is, the probability that a consumer will switch to a new product conditional
on having considered it. O¤ equilibrium, persuading a consumer to consider a product
does not guarantee that he will buy it, because he may fail to nd it superior to the
default. However, competitive forces imply that in equilibrium, persuading to consider
leads to a sale (as long as rms earn rational-consumer payo¤s). Of course, the result
that the conversion rate is 100% is extreme, and clearly relies on several unrealistic
features of the model, e.g. the assumption of consumer homogeneity. We view the result
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as a useful theoretical benchmark for richer, more pertinent theories of conversion rates
that incorporate consumer heterogeneity, among other things.
For some specications of the model, we can use the e¤ective marketing property to
characterize the unconditional probability that consumers switch a supplier. Consider,
for instance, the case where the collection fX(m)gm2D is a partition ofXnfxg. Recall
that ((m))m2D and ((x))x2X denote the probability that a message m is employed
and the probability that a product x is o¤ered under . Proposition 4 characterized
these quantities. By the e¤ective marketing property, the probability that a consumer
whose default is x 6= x will switch a supplier is (m(x)), where m(x) denotes the
unique message m for which (x; fmg) = 1. Therefore, by Proposition 4, the overall
switching rate isX
x 6=x
(x)(m(x)) =
X
m2D
(y
(m))(m) = 4
X
m2D
cm  (cx   cy(m))
where y(m) denotes the least preferred product in X(m).
Thus, the switching rate increases with advertising costs, as well as with the cost
di¤erence between the most preferred product and inferior products. The intuition for
these comparative statics is familiar from mixed-strategy equilibrium analysis. When
advertising costs go up, a higher probability that inferior products are o¤ered is re-
quired to restore the rmsindi¤erence between advertising and no advertising. Sim-
ilarly, when the cost of o¤ering x goes up, this product needs to be advertised more
intensively in order to restore the rmsindi¤erence between o¤ering x and o¤ering
an inferior product. Both changes raise the switching rate.
Note that the switching rate is equal to the expected cost of messages under .
This follows from the observation that the probability that a message is employed by
a given rm is (m), and the cost of the message is cm = 12(y
(m)).
3.3 Can Firms Attain Collusive Prots in Equilibrium?
Imagine a scale that measures consumersresistance to considering new alternatives.
At one end of the scale we have the fully rational consideration function which always
yields the feasible set. Suppose that at the other end of the scale we place the consid-
eration functions for which fX(m)gm2D constitutes a partition of X n fxg. At both
ends of this scale, the fully rational one and the boundedly rational one, we saw that
rms necessarily earn the rational-consumer payo¤ in symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Intuitively, one would expect the competition between rms to be ercer, the closer
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we move to the rational end of the scale. According to this intuition, rms would not
be able to make collusive prots when the consideration set becomes more likely to
coincide with the objectively feasible set.
This intuition turns out to be false, as the following pair of examples demonstrates.
Our rst example tampers with the assumption that the consumer population is ho-
mogenous. Suppose that originally, the consumersconsideration function is such that
rms earn rational-consumer payo¤s in symmetric equilibrium. Now assume that a
small group of rational consumers enters the market. The rational-consumer payo¤
continues to be 1
2
  cx. However, rms necessarily earn a higher payo¤ in equilibrium.
The reason is that if there are not too many rational consumers, inferior products
will continue to be o¤ered with positive probability in equilibrium. But thanks to the
presence of rational consumers, the strategy (x;?) generates a market share strictly
above 50%, and therefore a payo¤ above the rational-consumer level. Thus, making
the population of consumers more rationalcan cause industry prots to go up!
Our second examples respects the assumption of consumer homogeneity that runs
through this paper. Let X = f111; 100; 010; 001g and x = 111. Let D = f1; 2; 3g and
assume the following consideration function : X(1) = f001g, X(2) = f100g and
X(3) = f010g. Thus, fX(m)gm2D constitutes a partition of X n fxg. Let c111 = 13 ,
and let cm = cx = c < 130 for all m 2 D and x 6= x. By Proposition 4, in every
symmetric Nash equilibrium, rms earn the rational-consumer payo¤. Now consider
modifying the consumersconsideration function into 0, such thatX0(1) = f010; 001g,
X0(2) = f100; 001g and X0(3) = f100; 010g. This modication has a natural inter-
pretation. Each product may have up to three attributes. The most preferred product
has all three attributes. A message m is interpreted as an ad that focuses on the m-th
attribute. If the consumers default product lacks that attribute, the ad persuades him
that he should consider the new product. Note that [m2DX0(m) = X n fxg, but
fX0(m)gm2D is not a partition of X n fxg.
It can be shown that the modied consideration function generates a continuum
of symmetric equilibria, in which the support of the equilibrium strategy consists of
the strategies (111; f1g); (111; f2g); (111; f3g); (100;?); (010;?) and (001;?), and
rms earn payo¤s above the rational-consumer level. This example is a counterpart
to Proposition 2: it demonstrates that our market model may have symmetric Nash
equilibria in which rms attain collusive prots. However, although the consideration
functions that give rise to the counter-example is natural, the restriction on the cost
function is non-generic. Is it true that for generic cost functions, any symmetric Nash
equilibrium induces rational-consumer payo¤s? This is an open problem. At any
22
rate, our nal result in this section demonstrates that when costs are su¢ ciently low,
equilibrium payo¤s are equal to the rational-consumer level.
Proposition 6 If c(x; D) < 1=(2jDj+2), then rms earn the rational-consumer payo¤
in any symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that c(x; D)) < 1=(2jDj + 2), and yet rms earn
payo¤s above the rational-consumer level in some symmetric Nash equilibrium .
We rst claim that
1
2
X
xx
(x) < c(x
; D) (6)
To see why this is true, consider some (x;M) 2 Supp(). By Lemma 1, Supp()
must contain such a strategy. By our assumption that rms earn an expected payo¤
above the rational-consumer level, (x;M) must beat some other strategy (x;M 0) 2
Supp(). Dene Bv(M)  fx  x : (x;M) = vg. Note that B0(M) [ B1(M) =
X n fxg. For any (x;M) 2 Supp(), it must be the case that
1
2
X
x2B0(M)
(x)  c(x; D)  c(x;M)
Otherwise, it is protable to deviate from (x;M) to c(x; D). In addition, it must be
the case that
1
2
(x;M) +
1
2
X
x2B1(M)
(x)  c(x;M)  c(x0;M 0)
for some (x0;M 0) 2 Supp() that is beaten by (x;M). Otherwise, it is protable to
deviate from (x0;M 0) to (x;M). Summing over the last two inequalities, we obtain
inequality (6).
Since every (x;M) 2 Supp() must beat some (x0;M 0) 2 Supp(), it must be the
case that
1
2
(x;M)  c(x;M)  c(x0;M 0) < c(x; D)
Otherwise, it would be protable to deviate from (x0;M 0) to (x; D). It must be the
case that (x;?) =2 Supp() - otherwise, rms earn the rational-consumer payo¤ in ,
a contradiction. It follows that the number of strategies of the form (x;M) in Supp()
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is at most 2jDj 1. Summing over all these strategies, we obtain
1
2
X
M
(x;M) =
1
2
(x
) < 2jDj 1  c(x; D)
Combined with the inequality (6), we obtain
1 < (2jDj + 2)  c(x; D)
a contradiction.
Note that Proposition 6 does not rely on Properties (P1)-(P2), but on a weaker
condition that there exists M 2 M such that (x;M) = 1 for all x 6= x. Still, this
result is somewhat unsatisfactory for the following reason. When costs are small, the
probability that x is o¤ered is close to one, as can easily be seen from inequality
(6). Thus, a maxmin payo¤ result that holds only when costs are very small takes
some of the sting out of the distinction between the coincidence of the market outcome
with the rational-consumer benchmark and the coincidence of industry prots with the
rational-consumer benchmark.
4 An Extended Model
In this section we extend the consideration-sets model so as to encompass a greater
range of marketing e¤ects. As in the basic model of Section 2, a choice problem that the
consumer faces is an ordered pair of extended alternatives ((xs;M s); (xn;Mn)) 2 D2,
where D  XM. The consumer goes through the same two-stage procedure. In the
rst stage he constructs a consideration set. The extension is that the consideration
function  is now dened over the set of all ordered pairs of extended alternatives.
That is, let  : D2 ! f0; 1g. The consideration set is fxs; xng if (xs;M s; xn;Mn) = 1,
or fxsg if (xs;M s; xn;Mn) = 0. In the second stage, the consumer chooses the -
maximal product in the consideration set that he constructed in the rst stage.
The extension of the domain of the consideration function allows us to capture
additional marketing phenomena. We develop some of these applications in separate
papers.3
3A working paper version of the present paper included a detailed analysis of Example 4.3. Piccione
and Spiegler (2009) elaborate on Example 4.1 in the context of a di¤erent market model - see a
discussion in Section 7.
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Example 4.1: Packaging. Consumersdecision to add a new product to their consider-
ation set can also be inuenced by the way it is packaged. For instance, a consumer is
more likely to notice a new brand of avored water with added vitamins if its bottle is
designed so that it looks like the brand the consumer regularly buys.4 A similar phe-
nomenon known in the marketing profession as knock-o¤sor benchmarkingoccurs
when a rm attempts to associate its brand with a competing brand by mimicking the
latter advertising campaign.5
Example 4.2: Products as attention grabbers. When rms design their product lines
and retailers decide which products to put on display, they may take into account
the possibility that certain products can help drawing consumersattention to other
products on o¤er. For instance, think of a consumer who wants to buy a new laptop
computer. He initially considers a particular model x, possibly because it shares some
features with his current machine. The consumer may then notice that a computer
store o¤ers a model y that is signicantly cheaper or lighter than x. This gives the
consumer a su¢ cient reason to consider y in addition to x. Upon closer inspection,
the consumer realizes that he does not like y as much as he does x. However, since
he is already inside the store, he may browse the other laptop computers on o¤er and
nd a model z that he ranks above both x and y. Thus, although few consumers
may actually buy y, this model functions as a door openerthat attracts consumers
serious attention to the other products o¤ered by the store.6
In the remainder of this section, we will analyze market implications of two examples
of consideration functions that depend only on M s and Mn, using the same kind of
model of competitive marketing analyzed in Section 3. The following structure is
common to the two examples. Let M = f0; 1; :::; Kg and D = X M. Two rms
facing a continuum of identical consumers simultaneously choose an extended product
(x;M) 2 D. Each consumer is initially assigned to one of the rms (where each
rm receives half the population of consumers). The extended product chosen by this
rm plays the role of the default in the consumers choice procedure. Each rm aims
to maximize its market share minus the xed cost of its strategy c(x;M). The two
4For instance, compare the brand VitaminWater by Glaceau (http://www.glaceau.com) with
the competing brand Antioxidant Waterby Snapple (http://www.snapple.com).
5One recent example is the Beauty is. . .  campaign of Nivea, which is almost identi-
cal to the Real Beauty campaign of Dove. Compare http://www.nivea.de/beauty_is/ with
www.campaignforrealbeauty.com/.
6A vivid example of this e¤ect involves a soda company that issues a lim-
ited holiday edition including absurd avors such as Christmas ham or latke - see
http://www.jonessoda.com/les/limited_editions.php
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examples will di¤er only in the specication of c and . As in previous sections, x and
x denote the -maximal and -minimal products in X, and for every mixed strategy
 2 (D), (x) =
P
M (x;M).
4.1 Advertising Intensity
Most models of advertising in the literature represent this activity by a scalar in-
terpreted as advertising intensity (see Bagwell (2007)). The standard view in this
literature is that higher advertising intensity signals higher quality (see, e.g., Acker-
berg (2003)). In this sub-section we o¤er an alternative view. The more intensely
a product is advertised, the more likely it is to attract the consumers attention and
the more likely it is to be remembered by the consumer. (A similar perspective is
developed in Chioveanu (in press) - see Section 6.) For example, a number of stud-
ies (e.g., Janiszewski (1993) and Shapiro, MacInnis and Heckler (1997)) indicate that
advertisements, even if not explicitly recalled or recognized, may inuence consumers
especially with regard to the inclusion of a brand in a consideration set. This suggests
that advertising intensity has a defensive role. A rm may crank up its advertising
intensity in an attempt to prevent its consumers from considering a superior competing
product. As a result, higher advertising intensity need not be associated with higher
quality, in contrast to the conventional view.
To explore this intuition, we dene the consumersconsideration function as follows:
(xs;M s; xn;Mn) = 1 if and only ifMn M s. An element inM represents advertising
intensity. The consumer considers the new product xn if and only if it is advertised at
least as intensively as the status quo product xs. The rmscost function is as follows:
c(x;M) = cx + dM 2 (0; 12), where cx > cy if and only if x  y, and dM > dN if and
only if M > N . Let d0 = 0, and assume that cx   cx > d1.
Recall that the beating relation is the revealed strict preference relation over ex-
tended products induced by the considerationsets procedure. In the present sub-
section, (y;N) beats (x;M) if and only if N M and y  x. It is easy to see that this
relation is transitive (unlike the typical beating relation in Section 3). However, the
consumers observed choice behavior is not rational, because the revealed indi¤erence
relation over extended products violates transitivity. For example, if x  y  z, then
we would observe that the consumer does not switch from (z; 2) to (x; 1); and also
does not switch from (x; 1) to (y; 3). If the consumer were rational and had a complete
preference relation over extended products, then we would infer that he weakly prefers
(z; 2) to (x; 1) and weakly prefers (x; 1) to (y; 3): Hence, we would not expect him
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not to switch from (z; 2) to (y; 3). However, in our model, the consumer does indeed
switch.
Let us extend an important observation from Section 3. The max-min strategy for
rms is (x; 0), and the max-min payo¤ is 1
2
  cx. This is exactly the outcome that
would emerge in Nash equilibrium if consumers were rational - i.e., rms would o¤er
the best product and choose zero advertising intensity.
Proposition 7 In every SNE, (x) 2 (0; 1) and rms earn the rational-consumer
payo¤ 1
2
  cx.
Proof. First, let us show that in every SNE, (x) 2 (0; 1). Let  be a SNE strategy.
Suppose that (x
) = 0. Note that Supp() must contain a strategy that does not
beat any strategy in Supp(). This strategy generates a market share weakly below 1
2
.
If a rm deviates to (x; K), this strategy beats every strategy in Supp(), and thus
generates a market share of 1. By the assumption that c(x;M) < 1
2
for all (x;M), the
deviation is protable. Now suppose that (x
) = 1. Then, no pair of strategies in
Supp() beat one another. It follows that  assigns probability one to (x; 0). But this
means that it is protable to deviate into (x; 1).
Now assume that rms earn payo¤s strictly above 1
2
  cx under . Dene M as
follows: (x;M) 2 Supp(), and M > M for every other (x;M) 2 Supp(). There
must exist such M, by the previous step. Dene B(x;M) as the set of strategies
in Supp() that are beaten by (x;M). This set is nonempty - otherwise, (x;M)
would fail to generate a payo¤ strictly above 1
2
  cx. Let (y;N) 2 B(x;M) have the
property that y0  y for every (y0; N 0) 2 B(x;M).
The strategy (y;N) has two important properties. First, it does not beat any
strategy in Supp(). Assume the contrary - i.e., that (y;M) be beats some (y0; N 0)
in Supp(). Then it must be the case that N  N 0 and y  y0, hence M  N 0
and x  y0, which means that (x;M) beats (y0; N 0), contradicting the denition of
(y;N). Second, it is beaten by every (x;M) 2 Supp(), because M  M for every
such strategy. It follows that if a rm deviates from (y;N) into (x; K), it gains a
market share of 1
2
(x
) + 1
2
(1  (x)) = 12 , hence the deviation is protable.
Thus, when the consideration set is determined by advertising intensity, rms earn
the rational-consumer payo¤ in SNE, even though the equilibrium outcome itself de-
parts from the rational-consumer benchmark. Firms o¤er inferior products with pos-
itive probability in equilibrium. Note that expected advertising intensity is strictly
above zero in equilibrium. The reason is simple. If no rm advertised in equilibrium,
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then rms could play the strategy (x; 1) and avoid being beaten at all, thus generating
a payo¤ of 1
2
  cx   d1 > 12   cx, contradicting our result.
However, unlike the model of Section 3, the result that rms earn rational-consumer
payo¤s in equilibrium does not imply the e¤ective marketing property. For instance,
let X = f1; 2; 3g and M = f0; 1g. Assume 1  2  3, c2 > 12(c1 + c3) and
c2   c3 > d1. Then, it is easy to construct a SNE strategy  such that Supp() =
f(1; 0); (1; 1); (2; 1); (3; 1)g. Note that when the realization of this equilibrium is that
one rm plays (2; 1) while the other rm plays (3; 1), half the consumers will be assigned
to the former and consider the latter without switching to it.
The reason that the e¤ective marketing property does not hold in this model is
precisely the defensive role of intensive advertising: rms can use high advertising
intensity not only to attract the attention of the competitors clientele, but also to
block the rms own clientele from paying attention to the rival rm. Thus, it is
possible for the support of an equilibrium strategy to include two strategies, (x;M)
and (y;N), such that y  x (and x; y 6= x) and M  N . This means that a consumer
for whom (y;N) is the status quo will consider (x;M) because of the high advertising
intensity that accompanies x, yet fail to switch because x is inferior to y. The rationale
for accompanying x with high advertising intensity is to prevent consumers for whom
(x;M) is the status quo from considering better market alternatives such as (y;N).
4.2 Product Display
Product display in supermarkets and other stores is an important component of a rms
marketing strategy, as it plays a big role in generating shoppersattention to brands.
In many cases, big retailers demand slotting fees to put suppliersgoods on their
shelves, and these vary according to which positions are considered to be prime space.
For example, many stores consider eye-level shelves to be the top spot, while others
charge more for goods placed on end caps displays at the end of the aisles which
is believed to have the greatest visibility. To be on the right-hand-side of an eye-level
selection is also considered a prime location because most people are right-handed and
most peoples eyes drift rightward.7 In addition, the retailer often has considerable
bargaining power in setting these display costs.8 In this sub-section we develop a
simple example that illustrates the implications of display costs for competition among
manufacturers.
Let K  2. Assume that (x;M; y;N) = 1 if and only if one of the following
7The way the brain buys,The Economist, Dec 18th 2008.
8See Yehezkel (2009) and the references therein.
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conditions holds: (i) N = K; (ii) N = M 2 f1; :::; K   1g. The interpretation is
that an element in M represents a particular product display option. The option 0
represents no display, or hidden display, such that when consumers enter the store
they can nd the product only if they are already familiar with it from prior shopping
experience - i.e., when it is their default. The option K represents prominent display
(e.g., near the entrance or the cashiers). The options 1; ; ; ; K   1 represent "isle"
display. A consumer can notice a new product on isle display only if the product he
already familiar with is placed on the same isle.
Assume that c(x;M) = cx + dM 2 (0; 12), where 0 = d0 < d1 =    = dK 1 < dK .
That is, isle display costs more than no display and less than prominent display. These
assumptions imply that as in the previous sub-section, the max-min strategy is (x; 0)
and the max-min payo¤is 1
2
 cx, and these coincide with the Nash equilibrium outcome
when consumers are rational.
Proposition 8 There is a unique SNE, given by
(x; 0) = 2dK
(x; K) = 2(cx   cx)
(x; 0) = 1  2(cx   cx + dK)
Proof. Let  be a SNE strategy. We rst show that there exist no x 2 X and
M 2 f1; :::; K 1g such that (x;M) 2 Supp(). Assume the contrary, and let (x;M) 2
Supp() for some M 2 f1; :::; K   1g. In particular, let x have the property that for
every other (x0;M 0) 2 Supp(), x0  x or k =2 f1; :::; K   1g. By the niteness of the
support of , there exists such x. By the specication of , the strategy (x;M) does
not beat any other strategy in Supp(). Suppose that a rm deviates from (x;M) into
(x; 0), and let us compare the payo¤ that this strategy generates with the payo¤ that
(x;M) generates. First, the cost of (x; 0) is lower. Second, neither strategy beats any
strategy in Supp(). Third, if some strategy in Supp() beats (x; 0), it necessarily beats
(x;M). Thus, the deviation is protable, a contradiction. By eliminating the use of
the marketing strategies 1; :::K 1, we have reduced the model to that of Propositions
1 and 4, where we establish the existence of a unique SNE given by (3)-(5).
This equilibrium is structurally the same as in Propositions 1 and 4: only the best
and worst products are o¤ered in equilibrium, and the former is sometimes accompanied
by prominent display. Isle display does not exist in equilibrium. Thus, in the context
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of our simple example, if the retailer charges for isle display more than it does for
no/hidden display, manufacturers will not employ isle display at all, and they will only
choose between no/hidden and prominent display. It would be interesting to embed
the consideration-sets model in a larger, more pertinent model that endogenizes the
retailersdetermination of display costs for manufacturers.
5 Choice-Theoretic Aspects of the Model
In this sub-section we return to the basic consideration-sets model of Section 2. We
examine some of revealed-preference properties of the consideration-sets model, and
compare it to related models in the choice theoretic literature.
Recall our denition of the revealed strict preference relation (a.k.a the beating
relation) induced by the consideration-sets procedure: (y;N)  (x;M) if (x;N) = 1
and y  x. A natural question that arises is, which properties of  characterize the
consideration sets procedure? That is, can we state axioms on  that will be satised
if and only if there exist a linear ordering  on X and a consideration function  such
that (y;N)  (x;M) if and only if (x;N) = 1 and y  x? To answer this question,
we assume D = X M and introduce the following properties of binary relations on
extended products.
Denition 2 A binary relation  on D is quasi-complete (QC) if for every x; y 2 X,
exactly one of the following is true:
(i) (x;M)  (y;N) for some M;N 2M, or
(ii) (y;N 0)  (x;M 0) for some M 0; N 0 2M.
Denition 3 A binary relation  on D is quasi-transitive (QT) if (x;M)  (y;N)
and (y;N 0)  (z;M 0) imply (x;N 0)  (z;M 0).
Quasi-completeness means that it is always possible to nd a prole of marketing
strategies that will make the consumer compare a given default product with a given
potential substitute. Quasi-transitivity is a weakening of conventional transitivity,
which reects two key features of our model: (1) whether or not a consumer considers
a substitute to his default depends only on the default product and the marketing
strategy of the substitute, and (2) the choice between bareproducts (i.e., elements
in X) in the consumers consideration set is rational. Thus, if a consumer switched
from (y;N) to (x;M) and from (z;M 0) to (y;N 0), this must mean that x is preferred
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to y and y is preferred to z. Furthermore, the fact that the consumer was observed
switching from (z;M 0) to (y;N 0) means that N 0 attracts attention from z. It follows
that when the consumers default is (z;M 0); he would also switch to (x;N 0).
Remark 1 A binary relation  on D is irreexive, QC and QT if and only if there
exists a linear ordering  on X and a consideration function  : XM! f0; 1g such
that (y;M)  (x;N) for some N 2M i¤ y  x and (x;M) = 1.
Proof. Necessity is trivial, so we will only show su¢ ciency. For every x; y 2 X,
dene y  x if there exist M;N 2 M such that (y;M)  (x;N), and let x  y if
there exist M 0; N 0 2 M such that (x;N 0)  (y;M 0). By irreexivity, QC and QT,
 is irreexive, complete and transitive. Consider some (x;M) 2 X M. Suppose
x is not the -maximal product in X - i.e., there exists y 2 X such that y  x. If
(y;M)  (x;N) for some N , dene (x;M) = 1. By QC and irreexivity, there is
no N 0 such that (x;N 0)  (y;M). Otherwise, let (x;M) = 0. Suppose next that
x is -maximal product in X. Then, by the denition of , there are no y and N
such that (y;M)  (x;N). Hence, we are free to choose (x;M) = 0 or (x;M) = 1.
Suppose that y  x. Then, there exist some M 0; N 0 such that (y;M 0)  (x;N 0). If,
in addition, (x;M) = 1, then (y;M)  (x;N 00) for some N 00. Conversely, suppose
(y;M)  (x;N), then it follows from our construction that y  x and (x;M) = 1.
Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2008) independently conduct a choice-theoretic analy-
sis of a more general choice procedure than ours, which they call Choice by Iterative
Search(CIS). A consumer who follows this procedure begins with some exogenously
given default option r, taken from the feasible set B. Given this default, the con-
sumer constructs a consideration set 
(B; r)  B. The consumer chooses the best
alternative in 
(B; r) according to a complete preference relation % dened on the
grand set of alternatives X. If max%
(B; r) = r, the procedure is terminated and
the consumer chooses r. If max%
(B; r) 6= r, then the consumer constructs another
consideration set 
[B;max%
(B; r)] and picks his most preferred alternative from this
set. The procedure is iterated until the consumer picks some alternative y that satis-
es max%
(B; y) = y. The CIS procedure is characterized by the mapping 
 and the
preference relation %.
Our choice procedure is a special case of the CIS model. Given a pair of extended
products (xs;M s); (xn;Mn), let B = f(xs;M s); (xn;Mn)g, r = (xs;M s), 
(B; r) = B
if (xs;Mn) = 1, and 
(B; r) = frg if (xs;Mn) = 0. The strict part of the preference
relation % coincides with our . Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2008) show that the CIS
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model induces an extended choice function (a mapping from pairs, consisting of a set B
and a default r, to an element inB) which is fully characterized by two properties, which
they call Anchor Biasand Dominating Anchor Bias. Masatlioglu, Nakajima and
Ozbay (2009) develop further the choice-theoretic analysis of general consideration-set
procedures without default options, focusing on the problem of identifying preferences
and the mechanism that generates the consideration set from the consumers observed
choices.9
The consideration-sets procedure is also related to the idea of short-listing. A
decision maker who faces a large choice set may simplify his decision problem by rst
eliminating a subset of alternatives that are dominated according to some incomplete
preference relation, and then applying a complete preference relation to the remaining
set. Manzini and Mariotti (2007) provide a choice-theoretic characterization of this
procedure. The intuitive di¤erence between the two models is that although they
both apply a pair of binary relations in sequence, the short-listing model uses the
rst stage to shrink the choice set, whereas the consideration-sets model uses the rst
stage to expand it. Thus, when the binary relation of the rst stage gets closer to
being complete, the set of options on which the decision-maker applies his preferences
becomes smaller in the short-listing model, whereas in our model it becomes bigger.
Unlike the consideration-sets procedure, the short-listing model does not involve an
explicit default alternative. For this reason, a straightforward comparison between the
two models is impossible. However, one partial comparison, which is feasible, concerns
the special case in which the binary relations that are employed in both stages of
the short-listing model are complete and transitive. Then, the short-listing model is
reduced to standard rational choice.
Compare this with the advertising intensity example of Subsection 4.1. In that
example, the consideration function induces a complete and transitive binary relation
P on extended products, dened as follows: (y;N)P (x;M) if (M;N) = 1. In this
case, the consumer chooses his default xs, unless (xn;Mn)P (xs;M s) and xn  xs, in
which case he chooses xn. Thus, in order for the consumer to switch from the default
(xs;M s) to the new alternative (xn;Mn), the latter must be ranked above the former
according to two preference relations (and strictly so according to at least one of them).
As Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) showed, this sort of behavior is consistent with choosing
9Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2008) also provide a choice-theoretic characterization when the de-
fault is not observed, but has to be inferred from observations. A choice correspondence satises a
property called Bliss-Pointif, and only if, there exist a preference relation over alternatives  and
a consideration set mapping 
, such that for every B  X, each element chosen from B is selected
by the CIS procedure (
;) for some default.
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according to an incomplete preference relation over D, where a new product is chosen
over the default only if it is strictly better according to this incomplete preference
relation. Hence, the observed switching behavior of the consumer may be inconsistent
with rational behavior (recall our discussion of this point in Subsection 4.1).
A crucial di¤erence between the consideration-sets procedure and both the CIS and
short-listing models is that our model imposes more structure on the set of outcomes,
in the form of the distinction between products and marketing strategies. Salant and
Rubinstein (2008) study a choice model that involves a related distinction between
alternativesand frames. In their model, the frame accompanies the entire choice
set rather than an individual alternative. Of course, one can translate our concept of
a frame into theirs by taking the prole of marketing strategies to be the frame that
accompanies the choice set. Salant and Rubinstein provide necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for rationalizing a choice function (dened over framed choice problems)
with a (possibly incomplete) preference relation dened over the set of alternatives.
6 Relation to the Literature on Advertising and
Marketing
In this section we discuss the relation between our consideration-sets model and two
branches of literature: the economic literature on advertising, and the marketing liter-
ature on consideration sets.
6.1 Persuasive, Complementary and Informative Advertising
Models of advertising in economics typically make one of the following assumptions (see
Bagwell (2007)): (i) advertising changes the utility function from consumption (adver-
tising is persuasive); (ii) advertising enters into the utility function as an argument
(advertising is complementaryto consumption); and (iii) advertising does not a¤ect
the utility function but it a¤ects the consumers beliefs (advertising is informative).
In this sub-section we try to relate our model to this categorization.
Persuasive and complementary advertising
Recall from Sub-Section 5.1 that if a consumer in our model switches from a default
product x to a competing product y as a result of the marketing of y, then no set
of messages would cause the consumer to switch from y to x. Hence, our framework
cannot accommodate any model of persuasive or complementary advertising that allows
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such preference reversals. This raises the converse question: can consumer behavior
in our framework always be modelled as some form of persuasive or complementary
advertising?
In order to answer this question with regards to persuasive advertising, let us x
the same marketing strategy M for both rms. Persuasive advertising then means
that the consumer is characterized by a prole of weak preference relations (%M)MD
over X. The question is, can we nd a preference relation M such that the choice
from f(x;M); (y;M)g is maxMfx; yg? The answer is no, since it is possible that
(x;M) = 1; (y;M) = 0 and x  y. Thus, the consumer will choose y over x when
y is the default and x over y when x is the default. No preference relation %M can
rationalize this choice behavior.
Chioveanu (in press) analyzes an extension of Varians model of sales (Varian
(1980)), in which some consumers rationally perform price comparisons at no cost,
while other consumers are loyal to rms they are initially assigned to, where loyalty
means that they do not perform any price comparison. Chioveanu assumes that the
fraction of consumers who are loyal to a given rm in this sense is a function of the
prole of advertising expenditures in the industry. Although Chioveanu refers to this
advertising technology as persuasive, it does not fall into the denition of persuasive
advertising given above. Instead, the way Varian and Chioveanu model customer loy-
alty and persuasive advertising ts our model: a consumer is loyal to a rm if his
consideration set consists of the rms product only.
Advertising is complementary if the revealed choices of the consumer can be ra-
tionalized by a single preference relation over the extended set of alternatives D. As
emphasized repeatedly in this paper, the consideration-sets model can induce choice
behavior that cannot be rationalized by standard preferences over D. Hence, our model
accommodates choice behavior that cannot be captured by a model of complementary
advertising.
Informative advertising
Informative advertising typically takes two forms. First, in a search-theoretic envi-
ronment, advertising can reduce the search costs that the consumer needs to incur in
order to add a product to his choice set (in extreme cases, such as in Butters (1977),
costs fall from being innitely high to being zero). Second, advertising can cause the
consumer to update his beliefs about the quality of the product, either because the
advertising message contains veriable data or because it acts as a Spencian signalling
device.
The behavioral comparison between our model and informative advertising is subtle,
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because the latter approach assumes that the consumer has rational expectations about
the distribution of alternatives he is facing, a component that is absent from our model.
However, any model of informative advertising would necessarily display the following
monotonicity property. If an advertising message convinces the consumer to consider
a new product when his default is x, it should also convince him to consider the new
product when his default is inferior to x according to his preferences. The model
analyzed in Section 3 typically violates this type of monotonicity.
Conclusion
The consideration-sets model departs from the trinity of persuasive, comparative and
informative advertising. In our model, the role of marketing is persuading to con-
sider, and this role is related to, but distinct from these three conventional theories.
Finally, recall that our model incorporates other marketing activities than advertising,
including packaging, determination of payo¤-irrelevant product characteristics, search
engine optimization and design of product lines.
6.2 Related Marketing Literature
The marketing literature has long recognized that the consumption decision follows a
two-step decision process (for extensive surveys of this literature, see Alba, Hutchinson
and Lynch (1991) and Roberts and Lattin (1997)). Consumers rst form a small set
of options that they will consider for their consumption decision. They then evaluate
the options in this set and choose the one they prefer the most. Whether or not an
alternative is included in the consideration set may depend on factors other than the
consumers preferences.
Empirical evidence for this two-stage procedure is not trivial to gather, because the
rst stage is hard to observe. In a study of laundry detergent purchases, Hoyer (1984)
reports that the median number of packages that consumers closely examined, as they
browsed the relevant supermarket shelf, was one. Thus, even if new, superior brands
were displayed on the shelf, it is unlikely that they would have been considered by the
consumer, unless they were promoted.
Shum (2004) presents evidence that is consistent with the view that marketing
attempts to weaken consumersreluctance to consider new products. He carries out
counterfactual experiments which demonstrate that uninformative advertising may be
at least as e¤ective as price discounts in stimulating a purchase of a new brand.
Alba et al. (1991) emphasize the important role that memory plays in the forma-
tion of consideration sets. First, many purchasing decisions are made without having
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the feasible alternatives physically present (e.g., deciding on a restaurant for dinner).
Second, even when the available options are displayed to the consumer, the display
is often complex (e.g., nancial products, sophisticated electrical appliances) or over-
whelmingly varied (e.g., breakfast cereals or salad dressing in a supermarket). In these
circumstances, consumers rely on memory to a large extent. This implies that a pre-
ferred option may be ignored if it is not easily retrieved from memory.
For example, Nedungadi (1990) studied the e¤ect of uninformative advertising on
choice of fast food restaurant. Subjects were told that they would be given a coupon
for a fast food restaurant of their choice. On the premise that the experimenter had
only a limited variety of coupons available to him, subjects were asked to name their
most preferred restaurant and list all other restaurants for which they would accept a
coupon. In one treatment, before subjects provided the names, they were exposed to
an ad that mentioned a local sandwich shop (without any information on this shops
menu). Subjects in the control treatment were not exposed to this ad. Nedungadi found
that while most subjects in the control treatment listed mainly hamburger restaurants,
a signicant proportion of subjects in the advertising treatment named a well-known
sandwich chain - di¤erent than the one which was advertised - as their most preferred
choice. Thus, even though some subjects preferred sandwiches to hamburgers, the
former was unlikely to be chosen simply because it was not easily recalled when the
task was to choose a fast food restaurant.
Memory also plays a role in the choice between an existing brand of an incumbent
rm and a new competing brand of an entrant. The likelihood of choosing the new
product depends on the ease with which this product will be retrieved whenever the
consumer considers making a purchase from the product class to which it belongs.
Zhang and Markman (1998) propose that the likelihood of remembering a new brand
is inuenced by the way its attributes compare with those of the incumbent brand.
Specically, the authors provide experimental evidence suggesting that consumers are
more likely to recall a new brand if its advertised attributes are comparable with the
attributes of the incumbent brand along a common dimension (i.e. the di¤erences
between the two brands are alignable). Moreover, the authors demonstrate that a
superior new brand may not be chosen if its good attributes are hard to align with
those of the incumbent brand. In a similar vein, a recent study by Chakravarti and
Janiszewski (2003) presents experimental evidence suggesting that when people are
asked to select an alternative from a large set of heterogeneous alternatives, they tend
to simplify their decision problem by focusing on a small subset of easy-to-compare
options having alignable attributes.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces the concept of consideration sets into economic modeling and
develops its implications in the context of a competitive market model. As such, it
contributes to a growing theoretical literature on market interactions between prot-
maximizing rms and boundedly rational consumers. Rubinstein (1993) analyzes mo-
nopolistic behavior when consumers di¤er in their ability to understand complex pricing
schedules. Piccione and Rubinstein (2003) study intertemporal pricing when consumers
have diverse ability to perceive temporal patterns. Spiegler (2006a,b) analyzes markets
in which prot-maximizing rms compete over consumers who rely on naive sampling
to evaluate each rm. Shapiro (2006) studies a model in which rms use advertis-
ing to manipulate the beliefs of consumers with bounded memory. DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006, 2008), and Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
study interaction with consumers having limited ability to predict their future tastes.
Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2008) study the role of uninformative adver-
tising when consumers apply coarse reasoning. For a eld experiment that quanties
the e¤ects of various marketing devices in terms of their price-reduction equivalent,
See Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shar and Zinman (2008).
We hope to extend our market model in various directions. An important challenge
is to incorporate price setting into the model. Piccione and Spiegler (2009) apply the
consideration-sets model to a market environment that includes price setting but treats
all xed costs as sunk, and therefore cannot address rmsstrategic choice of marketing
costs. In the Piccione-Spiegler model, the consideration function is an arbitrary func-
tion of M s and Mn alone. It would be interesting to introduce prices as arguments of
the consideration function itself. For example, extreme prices are often good attention
grabbers (e.g., an ultra-expensive dish at a restaurant, or an ultra-cheap laptop at a
computer store). Thus, the trade-o¤ that a multi-product rm faces is that the atten-
tion grabber will make a direct loss (either because it is sold at a price below marginal
cost, or because it is so expensive that no one buys it and therefore it fails to cover
its xed costs), but it may generate indirect revenues by drawing consumersattention
to other products. The question of how rms resolve this trade-o¤ in a competitive
environment is left for future research.
We treat the consideration function  as exogenous. An interesting extension would
be to derive this function as a result of some prior optimization that is carried out by a
consumer who takes into account cognitive constraints. Still, there is some justication
for treating  as exogenous in our framework. The consideration function captures basic
37
principles of attention grabbing that do not seem to involve any deliberation on the
consumers part.10 For example, we will almost instinctively notice an ad printed on a
bright colored paper. Another example is the principle of similarity: we are more likely
to compare products, or to perceive them as substitutes, if they have similar packages or
similar advertising campaigns (recall the packaging and benchmarking examples from
Section 4). This principle lies at the heart of what is known to marketing practitioners
as associative positioning strategies, whereby a brand will use in its advertising
campaign features or slogans that are typically associated with a dominating brand
(e.g., see Dröge and Darmon (1987)). Likewise, people have a tendency to notice a
statement about some product aw when they themselves have consumed the product
and experienced its aw.
Whatever optimization lies behind the consumers heightened attention to a product
in these examples, it does not appear to be market-specic. Instead, it takes place on
a much larger, general equilibriumor evolutionaryscale, where the consideration
function is designed to be optimal on average across a large variety of market situations.
Therefore, as long as the focus of our analysis is on a specic market, it makes sense
to treat the consideration function as exogenous.
Another important extension of the model is in the direction of consumer hetero-
geneity. Since consumers in our model are characterized by two primitives, % and ,
heterogeneity may exist in both dimensions. We already saw in Sub-Section 3.3 an im-
plication of heterogeneity in  for industry prots. Heterogeneity in both dimensions
is needed for a pertinent theory of consumer conversion.
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